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I.

INTRODUCTION

While the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Federal Trade
1
Commission v. Actavis, Inc. resolved the circuit split regarding
2
reverse payment settlements, the full scope of its decision is yet to
be seen. The Court declined to hold that reverse payments were
presumptively unlawful or that they were immune from antitrust
attack. Rather, the Court held that a rule-of-reason approach
should apply when evaluating the antitrust implications of a reverse
payment settlement. The Court left it to lower courts to “jump in
3
the briar patch” and structure the rule-of-reason antitrust
litigation. Yet, the Actavis decision, statements by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), and some subsequent rulings provide insight
into what may constitute an acceptable reverse payment settlement

1. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
2. Id. at 2227. These settlements have been referred to by a variety of
names. While some may find this term misleading or pejorative, the Court chose
to use this term to describe a specific type of settlement and I will do the same for
consistency.
3. See In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), No. 1:09-MD-2084, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 174273, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2013) (“As much as I would love
some guidance from the Eleventh Circuit on how in the heck a trial judge (and a
jury) is supposed to apply the Actavis decision to an actual case, I doubt that the
Eleventh Circuit is going to jump into that briar patch until it has to.”).
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agreement. Lower courts will have to decide some seminal
questions in light of the decision:
(1) What is a “reverse payment”? Can it include nonmonetary
compensation?
(2) What makes a payment “large”?
(3) If the first-filed Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)
applicant gave up its statutorily granted 180-day market
exclusivity, does that impact the analysis?
(4) When is a reverse payment justified?
(5) Should courts apply the rule-of-reason analysis to all patent
settlements or only after it has determined that there was a
reverse payment?
The Actavis decision does not directly answer these questions.
However, a detailed review of the facts of Actavis, the decision itself,
statements by the FTC regarding its view of reverse payment
agreements, and some subsequent rulings provide insight into how
these questions may be answered and what may constitute an
acceptable reverse payment settlement agreement.
II. WHAT ARE REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS?
The Court characterized a “reverse payment” settlement
agreement as a settlement that “requires the patentee to pay the
4
alleged infringer, rather than the other way around.” The Court
described these settlements as typically taking the form of
Company A suing Company B for patent infringement. Company A
and Company B settle under terms that require (1) the claimed
infringer, Company B, to stay off the market until the patent’s term
expires, and (2) the patentee, Company A, paying Company B. The
Court noted that
[a]pparently most if not all reverse payment settlement
agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug
regulation, and specifically in the context of suits brought
under statutory provisions allowing a generic drug
manufacturer (seeking speedy marketing approval) to
challenge the validity of a patent owned by an already
5
approved brand name drug owner.
4. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227.
5. Id. at 2227. In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts disagrees with this
assertion. He points out that a patentee may pay an alleged infringer to drop
counterclaims of invalidity. Id. at 2245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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In its brief, Respondent Solvay posited as to why this might be
the case. According to Solvay, these settlements have “a different
6
appearance” due to the Hatch-Waxman statutory framework. This
framework typically provides for patent litigation before any
allegedly infringing product enters the market and before any
monetary damages can accrue. The FTC views reverse payments as
subverting the balance of competing policies struck by this
7
framework. According to the FTC, the framework reflects “a
balance of benefits for generic manufacturers and protections from
competition for brand-name manufacturers.” Reverse payments
upset this balance by giving the brand name manufacturer the
added opportunity to “purchase still more protections by sharing
8
monopoly profits.”
A.

The Basic Framework of Hatch-Waxman Litigation

Under the framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act, patent
litigation is typically required. A drug manufacturer seeking to
market a new prescription drug must submit a New Drug
9
Application with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
According to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America, on average, an innovator pharmaceutical company invests
10
more than one billion dollars for each FDA-approved medicine.
To protect these investments, brand name manufacturers seek
patent protection. Once the FDA has approved the brand name
drug for marketing, a manufacturer of a generic drug can enter the
11
market by filing an ANDA. An ANDA requires that the generic
manufacturer specify that its product will have the same active
ingredient and is biologically equivalent to the approved brand
12
name drug. This allows the generic manufacturer to avoid the
“‘costly and time-consuming’ studies needed to obtain approval”
6. Brief for Respondent Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. at 18, Actavis, 133 S.
Ct. 2223 (No. 12-416), 2012 WL 5507198.
7. Brief for the Petitioner at 16–17, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (No. 12-416),
2013 WL 267027.
8. Id.
9. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012).
10. Brief for Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA) as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223
(No. 12-416), 2013 WL 769196.
11. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2).
12. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A).
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for the brand name drug. As such, the average generic drug costs
14
only about one-third as much as the average brand name drug.
Yet, the consumers cannot enjoy these cost savings immediately.
The timing of an ANDA’s approval depends on the patent
covering the brand name drug, since the FDA cannot authorize a
15
generic drug that would infringe a patent. To facilitate approval,
the Hatch-Waxman framework directs brand name manufacturers
to list the patents covering the drug in the Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (commonly referred to as
16
the “Orange Book”). In turn, the generic manufacturer, when
filing its ANDA, must provide assurances that its proposed product
will not infringe any patent. This can take the form of certifying
that the relevant patents have expired, requesting approval to
market once the patents still in force expire, or by certifying that
any listed relevant patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use or sale” of the proposed drug (typically called a
17
“paragraph IV” certification). The filing of a paragraph IV
certification is a technical act of infringement and often provokes
18
the litigation. If the patentee brings suit within forty-five days of
the paragraph IV certification, the FDA must withhold approval of
the ANDA until a court resolves the issues of patent validity and
19
infringement, or thirty months have expired. The framework also
provides an incentive to the first ANDA filer by granting the first
20
filer 180 days of exclusivity. During this period of exclusivity, no
other generic can compete with the brand name drug. As stated by
the Supreme Court, the “vast majority of potential profits for a
generic manufacturing materialize during this 180-day exclusivity
21
period.”
This structure is not conducive to “typical settlements.” In a
“typical” patent case, the monetary value of potential damage from
13. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic Inc.,
496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990)).
14. Brief for Generic Pharmaceutical Association as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 8–9, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 769341.
15. Caraco Pharm., Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012).
16. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
18. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
20. Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
21. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 7, at 6).
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the infringement helps guide the form of the settlement. The
accused infringer can evaluate the risk by calculating the amount of
money that a jury will award. This is tied to the amount of
sales/profit made from the alleged infringing product. The
patentee can evaluate its risk by looking at the historical impact the
alleged infringing product had on its product. The patentee can, at
least in some respects, make an educated assessment of the value of
the risk of trial. These risk/reward calculations are more
speculative in the Hatch-Waxman context. The generic manufacturer’s calculus is based upon the likelihood that it will succeed
in litigation, the timing of the result, and the forecasted profits for
the potential drug. The brand name manufacturer’s calculus is
based upon the likelihood of success at litigation, the timing of the
result, and the forecasted impact of the generic on the market.
Because of the automatic stay of FDA approval, the timing of
the result is of great importance. Unlike a typical patentee that
wants to reach the result as soon as possible to realize its monetary
loss, or at a minimum prevent the alleged infringer from taking
some of its future profits, the brand name manufacturer is
incentivized to keep the litigation going. The brand name
manufacturer does not face any threat of competition until the
FDA approves the generic drug. The FDA will not approve the drug
without a court order or until the thirty-month stay has expired.
Thus, the brand name manufacturer has no incentive to accept
payment from the generic manufacturer. The brand name
manufacturer is not currently suffering a monetary loss and does
not need to “stop the bleeding.” Without a competitor in the
marketplace, there is generally no incentive for the brand name
manufacturer to accept any payment from the generic
manufacturer that is not close to the amount of profits it will
receive during the term of the patent. Unlike the typical alleged
infringer who is accruing profits during the litigation, the generic
manufacturer has no product during the litigation. The generic
manufacturer seeks quick resolution so it can enter the
marketplace. Thus, the generic manufacturer has no incentive to
pay the brand name manufacturer anything more than future
litigation costs to enter the market. These incentives create
settlements with a “different appearance.” Settlements generally do
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not take the form of the alleged infringer paying the patentee to
22
drop its claim and end the litigation.
B.

The Federal Trade Commission’s View of Reverse Payment Settlements
and Its Future Goals

Under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, the FTC and the Department of Justice
are charged with reviewing patent litigation settlements between
23
the brand name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer.
Each year, the FTC reports the number of settlements it deems
potentially anticompetitive. For fiscal year 2012 (October 1, 2011–
September 30, 2012) the FTC reviewed 140 patent settlements and
24
deemed forty settlements as potentially involving “pay-for-delay”
25
payments. The FTC designated them as potentially involving payfor-delay “because they contain both compensation to the generic
manufacturer and a restriction on the generic manufacturer’s
26
ability to market its product.” Of these forty settlements, nineteen
contained what the FTC classified as compensation in “the form of
a brand manufacturer’s promise not to make an authorized generic
(‘AG’) in competition with the generic manufacturer’s product for
27
some period of time (a ‘no-AG agreement’).” Of the remaining
140 settlements, the FTC deemed eighty-one as “restrict[ing] the
generic manufacturer’s ability to market its product, but
contain[ing] no explicit compensation,” and nineteen as having no
28
restrictions on generic entry. According to the FTC, there were a
record number of settlements containing potential pay-for-delay
22. The preceding considerations are based on the author’s experience.
23. See Actavis Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2242 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). For an
explanation of the Act’s filing requirements, see the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111–1118,
117 Stat. 2066, 2461–64.
24. The FTC’s definition of “pay-for-delay” appears on its face to be broader
than the Court’s definition of reverse payments. The details in each of these
settlement agreements are not publicly available.
25. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites
/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-trade-commission
-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-and/130117mmareport.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 5

2014]

REVERSE PAYMENT ANTITRUST PROCEEDINGS

1377

29

agreements in fiscal year 2012. As shown in the table below, the
FTC has increasingly classified settlements as pay-for-delay.
Fiscal Year
Final Settlements
Potential
Pay-for-Delay
Potential Pay-forDelay Involving
First Filers

2004
14

2005
11

2006
28

2007
33

2008
66

2009
68

2010
113

2011
156

2012
140

0

3

14

14

16

19

31

28

40

0

2

9

11

13

15

26

18

23

30

Figure 1: Settlements Classified as Pay-for-Delay

Yet, as pointed out by Respondents Par/Paddock in their
joint response brief, and as shown below, percentage of final
settlements that are classified as pay-for-delay agreements is
31
generally declining.

32

Figure 2: Percentage of Final Settlements FTC Classified as Pay-for-Delay

29. Id. at 2.
30. See Id.
31. The rise in “potential pay-for-delay” agreements in FY 2012 appears to
reflect an increase in settlement agreements in which the brand manufacturer
agreed not to market an “authorized generic.”
32. Chart created by author based on data in Brief for Respondents
Par/Paddock at 21–22, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013)
(No. 12-416), 2013 WL 682804.
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The FTC believes that the Actavis decision puts it in a much
33
stronger position. The FTC has stated its commitment to take the
34
following actions in light of the decision:
 pursue pay-for-delay matters currently in litigation and
seek appropriate relief for consumers;
 monitor private litigations alleging pay-for-delay
agreements and leverage Commission experience and
expertise by filing amicus briefs where appropriate;
 investigate pending pay-for-delay matters;
 examine new settlements that companies file with the
Commission pursuant to the Medicare Modernization
Act of 2003 (“MMA”) and investigate those that raise
anticompetitive concerns; and
 issue regular reports on pharmaceutical settlements
35
filed with the Commission pursuant to the MMA.
The FTC has also committed to re-examine previously filed
36
settlements in light of the Actavis decision. The FTC intends to
use all of the tools at its disposal, “including prospective restrictions
to prevent future violations, rescinding the illegal agreement, and
37
taking other actions to help expedite generic entry,” such as
seeking determination that a first filer has forfeited its 180-day
38
exclusivity.
III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM ACTAVIS
While the Supreme Court left it for lower courts to structure
the rule-of-reason for this kind of antitrust litigation, the Court’s
opinion provides some insight into how lower courts should view a
33. Pay-for-Delay Deals: Limiting Competition and Costing Consumers: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) [hereinafter Pay-for-Delay Hearing] (statement
of Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Federal Trade Commission).
34. Id. at 10. The FTC has also committed to pursue its two pending pay-fordelay litigations: Actavis and Federal Trade Commission v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv2141 (E.D. Pa. filed Feb. 13, 2008).
35. Pay-for-Delay Hearing, supra note 33, at 3 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 3 n.11 (“[A] generic company automatically forfeits its entitlement
to the 180-day exclusivity period that is otherwise available to first filing generics if
it is found to have violated the antitrust laws or the Federal Trade Commission
Act. Amended 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (2003).”).
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reverse payment. To gain a full understanding of the Court’s
opinion it is important to view the case against the backdrop of the
facts.
A.

Synopsis of the Facts of the Actavis Decision

Solvay received FDA approval for the brand name
39
pharmaceutical drug AndroGel in 2000. In January 2003, Solvay
40
obtained the relevant patent and listed it in the Orange Book.
Later that year, in May 2003, Actavis, Inc. (previously known as
Watson Pharmaceuticals) filed its ANDA seeking to make a generic
version of AndroGel. Actavis was the first filer, and by statute, was
eligible for the 180 days of market exclusivity once it launched its
41
generic version. Shortly thereafter, Paddock filed an ANDA for its
42
own product.
Both Actavis and Paddock certified under
paragraph IV that the proposed products did not infringe the
43
patent and/or that the patent was invalid. Par did not file its own
ANDA. Rather, it joined Paddock’s ANDA and agreed to share in
the patent litigation costs as well as share in any profits Paddock
44
might receive from selling its generic product. In August 2003,
45
Solvay sued Actavis and Paddock separately. From late 2003 to late
2005, the cases progressed with discovery, the parties filed claim
construction briefs, and Actavis and Par/Paddock filed motions for
46
nondispositive partial summary judgment. In January 2006, the
47
thirty-month stay expired and Actavis received final FDA approval.
At this point, Actavis could have launched “at risk” (i.e. Actavis
could have launched its generic drug despite the pending
48
litigation). Had it launched, Actavis would have been liable for
49
significant damages if it had lost the pending litigation.
39. Fed. Trade. Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
40. See id.; Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc. at 5–6, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223
(No. 12-416), 2013 WL 662705 (discussing the process by which Unimed and
Besins’s NDA was approved and listed in the Orange Book and Solvay’s later
acquisition of Unimed).
41. Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 6.
42. Id.
43. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
44. Id.
45. Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 6.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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In September 2006, the parties settled both litigations. The
district court had not issued a decision on claim construction or on
51
the pending partial summary judgment motions. The settlement
agreements dismissed the pending cases. The agreements granted
patent licenses to Actavis and Par/Paddock. The patent licenses
allowed Actavis and Par/Paddock to launch their respective generic
drugs starting in August 2015. This was five years before the patent
was set to expire. As part of the settlement, Actavis relinquished its
52
claim to the 180-day market exclusivity.
The parties also agreed to compensation for other services.
Solvay agreed to pay Actavis, over nine years, an estimated $19–30
53
million annually for Actavis to promote AndroGel to urologists.
Solvay agreed to pay Paddock $12 million to provide backup
manufacturing capacity for AndroGel from 2006 until 2012. Finally,
Solvay agreed to pay Par $10 million annually for Par to have its
54
sales force promote AndroGel to primary care physicians. Solvay’s
payments represented less than ten percent of AndroGel
55
revenues. For example, in 2007, AndroGel had sales of more than
56
$400 million.
B.

A Detailed Review of the Supreme Court’s Five Sets of Considerations
to Bring a Claim.

Faced with these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that “the
FTC should have been given the opportunity to prove its antitrust
57
claim.” The Court based its conclusion on the following five sets
of considerations:
(1) The restraint has the “potential for genuine adverse effects on
58
competition.”
(2) The anticompetitive consequences of the reverse payment “will
59
at least sometimes prove unjustified.”
50. Id.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
54. Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 8; Brief for the
Petitioner, supra note 21, at 11–12.
55. Brief for Respondent Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. at 6, Actavis, 133 S.
Ct. 2223 (No. 12-416) 2013 WL 648743.
56. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 11–12.
57. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.
58. Id.
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(3) “Where a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified . . .
harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that
60
harm.”
(4) The antitrust action is feasible and it is normally not necessary
61
to litigate the patent’s validity.
(5) “The fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment risks
antitrust liability does not prevent [potential settlement of the
62
patent claims].”
Reviewing each of these considerations, and, in turn,
considering the facts of Actavis, it appears that almost any payment
from the brand name manufacturer to the generic manufacturer
can serve as a basis for an antitrust action.
1.

Potential Genuine Adverse Effect on Competition

Based on the Court’s opinion, a payment from the brand
name manufacturer to the generic manufacturer, regardless of the
parties’ stated purpose for the payment, is sufficient to meet this
first consideration. In the Court’s view, “[t]he payment in effect
amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell
its product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent
litigation were to continue and the patent were held invalid or not
63
infringed by the generic product.” The fact that Solvay, Actavis,
and Par/Paddock classified the payments as part of a separate
business deal did not factor into the Court’s opinion. Rather,
presumably because this was a motion to dismiss, the Court viewed
the settlement on terms set by the FTC—a payment in return for
64
staying out of the market and keeping prices at patentee-set levels.
The Court conceded that settlements, like the one at issue, which
permit the generic manufacturer to enter the market prior to the
patent expiring, would bring about competition that benefits the
65
consumer. But the Court did not view the early entry as enough to
overcome the adverse effect of the payment. Rather, the Court
stated that the payment may “provide strong evidence that the
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 2235–36.
Id. at 2236.
See id.
Id. at 2237.
Id. at 2234.
Id.
Id.
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patentee seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its
claim with a share of its monopoly profits that would otherwise be
66
lost in the competitive market.”
In addition, the Court did not take into account that the
settlement at issue allowed the second filer, Par/Paddock, early
67
market entry. Actavis gave up its 180-day exclusivity, so Par,
Paddock, and Actavis would all enter the market on the same day.
Arguably, consumers received a large benefit by Actavis giving up
its right as competition would increase. According to the FTC, the
price typically drops twenty percent when a first generic enters the
market and up to eighty-five percent when there are multiple
68
generics in the marketplace. While, as the Court recognized, the
180-day market exclusivity granted to the first filer provided a
valuable right which “can be worth several hundred million
69
dollars,” the Court focused its analysis on the payment itself. The
Court noted that according to scholars, “where only one party owns
a patent, it is virtually unheard of outside of pharmaceuticals for
70
that party to pay the accused infringer to settle the lawsuit.”
The Court was not persuaded that the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
71
unique regulatory framework required a different result. The
Court viewed the Hatch-Waxman Act’s grant of 180-day market
72
exclusivity as a barrier to competition. According to the Court,
subsequent ANDA filers would be deterred from bringing suit once
73
the first filer settles. Because of the 180-day exclusivity, a litigation
victory by a subsequent ANDA filer will free not only that ANDA
filer, but all other potential competitors. Thus, according to the
Court, the potential reward to the subsequent challenger is
74
significantly less than the patentee’s payment to the first filer. In
addition, the subsequent ANDA filer, after learning that the first
filer has settled, if sued, will have to wait roughly thirty months
75
before receiving FDA approval. Because of these features, the
Court concluded that a reverse payment settlement with the first
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 2235.
Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 8.
Pay-for-Delay Hearing, supra note 33, at 6.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012)).
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filer “removes from consideration the most motivated challenger,
76
and the one closest to introducing competition.” Thus, from the
Court’s perspective, the payment from the patentee to the alleged
infringer, alone, is enough to meet the consideration that there is
77
potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.
2.

Was the Payment “Justified”

The Court also determined that anticompetitive consequences
from reverse payments will sometimes be unjustified. The Court
78
noted that there may be legitimate justifications for payment. But
79
the time to raise justifications is at the antitrust proceedings.
The Court did provide some insight into potential
justifications. First, the reverse payment may be no more than a
rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through
80
settlement. However, this amount may not be enough to
incentivize the parties to settle. The typical cost of Hatch-Waxman
81
litigation is approximately $6 million through trial. Of this
$6 million, it costs approximately $3.25 million to reach the end of
82
discovery. For example, in Actavis, the parties had completed
83
discovery. Based on the typical litigation costs, a rough
approximation of the litigation expenses saved through settlement
would be $2.75 million in total. In contrast, Actavis settled for an
estimate of $20–30 million per year, Paddock settled for $2 million
84
per year, and Par settled for $10 million per year. Based on these
numbers, it is questionable whether litigation expenses saved
through settlement alone provides enough incentive to settle
Hatch-Waxman litigation.
The Court also noted that payment from the brand name
manufacturer to the generic manufacturer may represent

76. Id. (citing C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1586 (2006)).
77. See id. at 2235.
78. Id. at 2236.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 37 (2013) (referring to more than $25 million at risk).
82. See id.
83. See Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 8.
84. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229; Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra
note 40, at 8; Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 11–12.
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compensation for other services, such as distributing the brand
85
name drug or developing a market for the drug. In Actavis, the
86
settlement stated that the payments were for other services.
Actavis was paid to promote the brand name drug to urologists,
Paddock was paid to provide backup manufacturing capacity for
the brand name drug, and Par was paid to have its sales team
87
promote the brand name drug to primary care physicians. Yet, at
this stage of the proceedings, these factors did not sway the Court.
88
Rather, the Court left this issue for the antitrust proceedings.
The Court did not limit the justification to these examples.
The Court clearly stated that “[t]here may be other justifications”
that would not raise the concern that the patentee was using its
89
monopoly profits to avoid the risk of losing the litigation.
3.

The Patentee’s Ability to Bring About the Anticompetitive Harm

The Court determined that the size of the reverse payment is
indicative of market power and thus the patentee’s power to bring
90
the harm into practice. The Court did not provide any analysis as
to whether the size of Solvay’s payments were “large sums” in the
context of the case and thus indicative of its power. Rather, relying
on studies referred to by the FTC in its briefing, the Court stated
that “reverse payment agreements are associated with the presence
of higher-than-competitive profits—a strong indication of market
91
power.”
The strength of Solvay’s patent also did not factor into this
consideration. While the Court stated that “[a]n important patent
itself helps to ensure such power,” the Court did not analyze the
92
strengths and weaknesses of Solvay’s patent. It appears that, in the
context of Hatch-Waxman settlements, a payment from patentee to
the alleged infringer was sufficient to meet this consideration. The
logical conclusion is that the “importance” of the patent, and thus,
patentee’s market power, is dictated by the patentee listing the
patent in the Orange Book as covering the brand name drug.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
Id. at 2229.
See Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 6–7.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238.
Id. at 2236.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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The Size of the Unexplained Payment Is a Workable Surrogate for
Litigating the Patent Issues and Makes the Antitrust Litigation
Feasible.

It is the Court’s view that it is not necessary to litigate the
patent to answer the antitrust questions arising from a reverse
93
payment. Rather, the Court relies on the size and justification of
the payment. According to the Court “[a]n unexplained large
reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has
94
serious doubts about the patent’s survival.” The Eleventh Circuit
disagreed with this assessment. In its opinion, “[w]hen hundreds of
millions of dollars of lost profits are at stake, ‘even a patentee
confident in the validity of its patent might pay a potential infringer
95
a substantial sum in settlement.’” Thus, the payment size was
reflective of the “reality of patent litigation and the risks it presents
96
to the patent holder.” While the Court recognized that a patentee
may be willing to make a large payment to avoid the risk of
invalidity, that justification alone is insufficient to avoid antitrust
97
liability. The payment, without any additional explanation, “likely
98
seeks to prevent the risk of competition.” Simply put, in the
Court’s view, the size of an unexplained payment could be used as
99
a “workable surrogate” instead of litigating the patent issues.
5.

Antitrust Liability for Large Unjustified Reverse Payments Does
Not Prevent Parties from Settling

The final consideration in the Court’s analysis is the parties’
ability to settle. According to the Court, parties are still able to
100
settle patent claims. The primary example the Court provides is a
settlement which allows the generic manufacturer to enter the
market prior to expiration and without payment from the brand
101
name drug. Yet, this is only an example. The Court refused to
93. See id. at 2237.
94. Id.
95. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1310
(11th Cir. 2003)).
96. Id.
97. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 2236–37.
100. Id. at 2237.
101. Id.
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hold that all reverse payment settlements are presumptively
unlawful. Rather, the question is simply what the reasons for the
reverse payment are. As the Court notes, “[i]f the basic reason is a
desire to maintain and to share patent-generated monopoly profits,
then, in the absence of some other justification, the antitrust laws
102
are likely to forbid the arrangement.”
C.

What Is Left Unanswered by Actavis

Dismissing antitrust claims based on reverse payment
settlements has become more challenging given the Court’s
analysis and its decision to allow the FTC the opportunity to prove
its case. A broad reading of the opinion would lead to the
conclusion that to survive a motion to dismiss, the FTC must plead
that there was a large payment from the innovator company to the
generic filer. While throughout its analysis the Court classified the
payment as unexplained or unjustified, it explicitly stated that an
antitrust defendant may have legitimate justifications for the
103
payment. If this is the case, the Court leaves open three seminal
questions: (1) what constitutes a payment?; (2) what makes a
payment “large”?; and (3) what impact, if any, does giving up 180day exclusivity have in the analysis?
1.

What Is “Payment”?

In Actavis, the payment was clear. Payment was in the form of
money from Solvay to the generic challengers. The question
remains whether nonmonetary benefits should also be viewed as a
payment. Many settlements include terms that provide nonmonetary benefits to the generic manufacturer. For example,
brand name manufacturers enter into no-authorized-generic (AG)
agreements with generic manufacturers. These no-AG agreements,
according to the FTC, typically take the “form of a brand
manufacturer’s promise not to market an [AG] in competition with
104
the generic manufacturer’s product for some period of time.”

102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 2236.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012, at 1
(2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports
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The FTC classifies these types of agreements as pay-for-delay, but
district courts have reached various conclusions.
a.

District Court Construes Reverse Payment Settlements as
Requiring a Monetary Payment

For example, in In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust
Litigation, Judge Walls found that a no-AG agreement was not
105
payment. In that case, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) sold Lamictal
Tablets and Lamictal Chewables to treat epilepsy and bipolar
106
disorder. The drug was profitable; for example, domestic sales of
Lamictal Tablets from March 2007 to March 2008 exceeded $2
107
billion. Teva filed two ANDAs, which contained paragraph IV
108
109
certifications, with the FDA in 2002. GSK brought suit. The case
went to trial and the judge ruled from the bench that one claim of
110
the asserted patent was invalid. The judge was still deliberating
the validity of the remaining claims when the parties reached a
111
settlement. The settlement did not include a monetary payment.
The key settlement terms were: (1) Teva was permitted to sell
generic chewables by June 1, 2005, supplied by GSK, approximately
thirty-seven months before the expiration of the patent, and before
FDA approval of Teva’s tablet ANDA; (2) Teva was permitted to sell
generic tablets on the expiration date of the patent on July 21, 2008
and, if GSK did not receive pediatric exclusivity, Teva could enter
the market approximately six months earlier; (3) GSK granted Teva
a waiver of any pediatric exclusivity GSK was granted; and (4) GSK
112
agreed not launch its own AG until January 2009.

/agreements-filed-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug
-improvement-and/130117mmareport.pdf.
105. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9257 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). In light of the Actavis decision, Judge
Walls reconsidered his previous finding that a settlement including a non-AG
agreement was not a sufficient basis for an antitrust claim. The earlier opinion can
be found at In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 183627 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012) (unpublished).
106. In re Lamictal, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9257, at *2.
107. Id. at *2.
108. Id. at *3.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *3–4.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *4–6.
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Direct purchasers brought suit alleging that the settlement
113
violated antitrust law. Defendants GSK and Teva moved to dismiss
for failing to allege a cause of action on the grounds that the
114
settlement did not involve a cash-only reverse payment.
The court, in an unpublished decision, initially granted the
115
defendants’ motion to dismiss. In its earlier decision, the court
found that “the term ‘reverse payment’ was not sufficiently broad to
encompass any benefit that may fall to Teva in a negotiated
116
settlement.” Moreover, the court recognized that Teva received
consideration in the settlement and “consideration is an essential
117
element of any enforceable contract.” The court also noted that
“there is ‘payment’ in every settlement” and classified this
118
settlement as based on negotiated entry dates. Accordingly, the
court found that the settlements met a strong policy objective by
introducing “generic products onto the market sooner than what
119
would have occurred had GSK’s patent not been challenged.”
The court also considered the real-world impact of settlement.
When monetary payments are not part of the settlement equation,
“companies with abundant cash have less leverage to delay entry of
120
generic drugs.” GSK needed to find a different bargaining chip
and “GSK’s promise not to enter the market with its own generic
121
products is such an example.”
The Actavis decision did not alter the court’s view of the
settlement. According to the court, Actavis only applies to monetary
122
reverse payments. The court was unwilling to extend the Actavis
123
holding beyond its facts. The court found that “nothing in Actavis
says that a settlement contains a reverse payment when it confers
substantial financial benefits or that a [no-AG] agreement is a

113. Id. at *6.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 183627, at *15 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012).
117. Id. at *16.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *19.
120. Id. at *20.
121. Id.
122. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9257, at *18–26 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014).
123. Id. at *25–26.
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124

‘payment.’” The court read the majority and dissenting opinions
125
as “reek[ing] with discussion of payment of money.” While the
court recognized that Black’s Law Dictionary defined “payment” as
“[p]erformance of an obligation by the delivery of money or some
other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharge of an
obligation,” the court did not find that Actavis supported such a
126
broad reading.
b.

District Courts Construe Reverse Payments As Including
Nonmonetary Payments

While Judge Walls found that the term “reverse payments” and
the decision in Actavis constituted only cash payments, two courts
127
have recently reached a different conclusion. Judge Sheridan
128
viewed the term differently in In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation.
Pending before the court was the direct purchaser class plaintiffs’
motion for leave to amend the consolidated complaint and the
129
defendants’ motion to dismiss various complaints on multiple
130
grounds. The motions were originally briefed before the Actavis
decision. The court requested supplemental briefing in light of the
131
132
decision.
The case involves Pfizer’s drug Lipitor.
Pfizer
obtained seven patents covering different aspects of the Lipitor
133
product. “Ranbaxy filed the first . . . ANDA to market generic
134
Lipitor.” Ranbaxy certified, under paragraph IV, that the selling
135
of its product would not infringe any valid claim. Pfizer brought
suit. “From 2003 to 2006, the patent litigation progressed through
discovery, trial,” a district court decision, and a federal circuit
136
decision. In late 2006, the district court enjoined the FDA from
124. Id. at *21.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *22 (alteration in original).
127. Judge Walls found these decisions’ interpretation of Actavis as
“unsupported by the words of Actavis or are inapposite.” Id. at *27.
128. No. 3:12-cv-2389, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126468 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013).
129. Defendants include Pfizer, Inc., Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals, WarnerLambert Co., and Warner-Lambert Co., LLC. Id. at *15.
130. Id. at *14–15, *54–85.
131. Id. at *92–93.
132. Id. at *18.
133. Id. at *19.
134. Id. at *32.
135. Id. at *32–33.
136. Id. at *33.
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137

approving Ranbaxy’s ANDA until March 2010. While the U.S.
litigation was pending, Pfizer filed numerous international lawsuits
138
against generic manufacturers.
In 2007, Pfizer also initiated
139
Ranbaxy filed
re-issue proceedings for one of the patents.
140
numerous protests during the re-issue proceedings. In addition,
on March 24, 2008, Pfizer sued Ranbaxy alleging infringement of
two non-Orange Book process patents, even though Ranbaxy was
141
enjoined from selling its generic Lipitor.
In April 2008, Pfizer and Ranbaxy settled the reissue
142
proceedings, and in June 2008, the parties entered into an
agreement that “settled global patent proceedings regarding
143
Lipitor including the U.S. patent litigations.” Ranbaxy agreed not
to enter the market until November 30, 2011. Ranbaxy did not
waive its 180-day exclusivity but dropped any challenges to the
144
reissued patent. Pfizer also agreed to forgive the outstanding
money judgments against Ranbaxy that were unrelated to Lipitor
and settled Pfizer’s suit against Ranbaxy regarding a generic
145
version of Caduet. Pfizer also agreed to dismiss an action against
Ranbaxy regarding Ranbaxy’s “at risk” launch of a generic version
146
of Accupril.
The court dismissed most of the antitrust claims. However, the
plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to clarify and augment
147
their reverse payment allegations. The plaintiffs argued that the
Pfizer/Ranbaxy settlement of the Accupril litigation was a payment
by Pfizer to Ranbaxy to delay the launch of generic Lipitor, despite
148
the fact that Ranbaxy made a $1 million payment to Pfizer. The
defendants argued that the proposed amendments were futile since
Actavis applies only to settlements involving large monetary
payments. Judge Sheridan disagreed. While declining to decide
137. Id. at *36.
138. Id. at *37–40.
139. Id. at *40.
140. Id. at *40–41.
141. See id. at *45–47.
142. Id. at *42.
143. Id. at *47–48.
144. Id.
145. Caduet is a combination drug which contains the active ingredient in
Lipitor. See id. at *48.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *94.
148. Id.
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whether the amendments would survive a motion to dismiss, the
court noted that “nothing in Actavis strictly requires that the
payment be in the form of money, and . . . decline[d] to hold that
149
the amendments would be futile on that basis.”
150
In In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, Judge Young
151
shared Judge Sheridan’s broad reading of Actavis. In this case, a
group of wholesale drug distributors filed antitrust claims against
AstraZeneca and each of three generic defendants—Ranbaxy,
Teva, and Dr. Reddy’s. The plaintiffs alleged that AstraZeneca and
each of the three generic defendants entered into reverse payment
agreements to keep a generic version of Nexium off the market.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint.
AstraZeneca listed fourteen patents in the Orange Book as covering
152
Nexium. Ranbaxy was the first ANDA filer. Ranbaxy filed its
ANDA, which included a paragraph IV certification stating that it
would not infringe any valid claim for the patents that expired after
153
October 2007. AstraZeneca filed an infringement suit against
154
Ranbaxy.
Several months after AstraZeneca filed suit, Teva
provided notice of its paragraph IV certification and was
155
subsequently sued by AstraZeneca. Later that same year, Dr.
Reddy’s provided notice of its paragraph IV certification and was
156
also sued by AstraZeneca.
After the parties completed discovery in the Ranbaxy case,
157
AstraZeneca and Ranbaxy settled.
Ranbaxy agreed to the
following:
(1) Admit that the patents-in-suit were valid and enforceable;
(2) Admit that Ranbaxy’s generic product would infringe some of
the patents; and
158
(3) Delay launch of its generic product until May 27, 2014.

149. Id. at *95.
150. No. 12-md-02409-WGY, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *10 (D. Mass.
Sept. 11, 2013).
151. See id. at *62 (“This Court does not see fit to read into the opinion a strict
limitation of its principles to monetary-based arrangements alone.”).
152. Id. at *25.
153. Id. at *25–26.
154. Id. at *26.
155. Id. at *28.
156. Id. at *29.
157. Id. at *30. Allegedly, under the terms of the settlement, AstraZeneca
agreed to pay Ranbaxy over $1 billion. Id.
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Ranbaxy retained its 180 days of market exclusivity. Before the
court could enter final judgment in the Teva matter, AstraZeneca
159
and Teva settled. The terms of this settlement were similar to the
Ranbaxy settlement. Teva agreed to:
(1) Admit that the patents listed in the Orange Book were valid
and enforceable;
(2) Admit that its proposed product would infringe some of the
patents; and
160
(3) Delay launch of its generic product until May 27, 2014.
Teva did not receive a monetary payment from AstraZeneca.
Rather, Teva had additional liability to AstraZeneca related to its
161
“at risk” launch of a generic version of Prilosec. The Federal
Circuit upheld a decision that the Prilosec patents were valid
162
and infringed. Allegedly, as part of the Nexium settlement,
AstraZeneca forgave a significant portion of the monetary damages
for the Prilosec infringement.
Similarly, before the court could enter judgment in the Dr.
163
Reddy’s matter, AstraZeneca settled with Dr. Reddy’s. Dr. Reddy’s
agreed to refrain from challenging the Nexium patents and to
164
defer launch of its product until May 27, 2014. Dr. Reddy’s also
did not receive a monetary payment from AstraZeneca. Rather, Dr.
Reddy’s had additional liability to AstraZeneca related to its “at
risk” launch of a generic version of Accolate. AstraZeneca agreed to
165
forgive this liability.
In their motion to dismiss, the generic defendants argued that
166
they did not receive a monetary payment from AstraZeneca.
Rather, the defendants argued that AstraZeneca and Ranbaxy
entered into a no-AG agreement granting Ranbaxy the exclusive

158. Id. at *30–32.
159. Id. at *34–35.
160. Id. at *35.
161. Id. at *35–36.
162. Id. at *36 (citing In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
163. Id. at *37.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *59. The alleged billion dollar payment from AstraZeneca to
Ranbaxy was in dispute. Judge Young stated that it did not factor in his analysis. See
id. at *59 n.20.
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license to market during its 180-day period of market exclusivity.
AstraZeneca also forgave Teva and Dr. Reddy’s of contingent
liabilities for past patent infringement. Judge Young applied a
broad reading of the term “payment” and found that these
agreements constituted a reverse payment. Judge Young noted that
“[n]owhere in Actavis did the Supreme Court explicitly require
some sort of monetary transaction to take place for an agreement
between a brand and generic manufacturer to constitute a reverse
168
payment.” Yet, the court admitted that “the Supreme Court spoke
only to the merits of cash payouts as a quid pro quo for promises of
169
delayed generic market entry.” Judge Young adopted a broader
interpretation of payment. Relying on the FTC’s view that no-AG
agreements are pay-for-delay, Judge Young determined the
AstraZeneca/Ranbaxy no-AG agreement was equivalent to a reverse
170
payment. Judge Young also viewed the Teva and Dr. Reddy’s
agreements as reverse payments since courts have recognized that
171
contingent liabilities have value.
2.

What Constitutes a “Large” Payment?

In addition to the lack of clarity regarding what constitutes a
“payment,” it is unclear what exactly constitutes a “large” payment.
Throughout the Actavis opinion, the Court repeatedly states that
172
the payment must be “large.” The opinion, however, provides
little insight into what makes a payment “large.”
In its briefing, Solvay pointed out that its payments to the
generic manufacturers represented less than ten percent of the
173
AndroGel revenues. The Actavis Court was not swayed by this
argument and did not mention it in the opinion. Rather, the Court
indicated that a payment would be “large” if the patentee pays a
generic challenger a sum even larger than what the generic would
174
gain in profits if it won the litigation and entered the market.
According to an amicus brief, the payments from Solvay to the
generic manufacturers ($29–42 million per year) were estimated to
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at *60.
Id. at *61.
Id.
See id. at *62 n.22.
See id.
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235–37 (2013).
Brief for Respondent Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 55, at 6.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235.
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be greater than what the generics could have made by entering the
175
market ($31.25 million per year). This begs the question: If
Solvay settled with all of the generic manufacturers for only
$29 million per year, would the payment be “large”? In addition,
176
conducting such an analysis requires some detail in the record.
Would the plaintiff need to make such an assertion in its complaint
to withstand a motion to dismiss?
Moreover, the Court did not view the individual payments to
177
each generic. Actavis gave up its 180-day exclusivity. Therefore,
Paddock and Par could enter the market the same time as Actavis,
yet still received significantly smaller payments from Solvay
178
($2 million and $10 million per year respectively) than Actavis. It
is unclear whether Paddock and Par received a sum larger than
what it would have gained in profits if they had won the litigation
and entered the marketplace, given that Actavis gave up its 180-day
exclusivity. From the discussion in the opinion, it appears that the
Court viewed the payments in total, rather than by the individual
179
settlements. The Court viewed all of the parties as initial filers.
Solvay settled with Actavis, Par, and Paddock at around the same
180
point in time. Would the Court have viewed the size of the Par
and Paddock payments differently had Actavis given up its 180-day
exclusivity and Par and Paddock settled significantly after Actavis?
The Court also seemed to indicate that payments that reflect
“traditional settlement considerations,” such as an amount no more
than a rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved
though settlement or the fair value for services, would be a
181
legitimate justification for a reverse payment. However, the Court
stated that the defendant would have an opportunity to present
182
these justifications during the antitrust proceedings. Moreover,
the Court explicitly distinguished size from scale, and independence from other services when explaining the rule-of-reason
175. Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business Professors and
the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Petitioners at 25, Actavis, 133 S. Ct.
2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 391001.
176. Id. at 25 n.7 (noting that they could not “determine the exact number
because the district court did not allow development of the record”).
177. Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 7.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54.
179. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 49–51.
181. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
182. Id.
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183

approach. The Court stated that the “anticompetitive effects
depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated
future litigation costs, its independence from other services for
which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other
184
convincing justification.” Therefore, it is unclear what constitutes
a “large” payment, and it is left by the Supreme Court for district
courts to determine.
3.

What Impact, If Any, Does Giving up the 180-Day Market
Exclusivity Have?

The Court did not address the impact of Actavis’s choice to
give up its 180-day exclusivity. While the Court recognized that this
is a valuable right that can be “worth several hundred million
185
dollars,” it does not appear to have impacted the Court’s analysis.
By giving up this right, Actavis provided significant benefits to the
consumer by allowing more generics to enter the market. Would
this justify the payment? Giving up such a right does not on its face
reflect traditional settlement considerations, since Solvay did not
receive a direct benefit. In fact, this increased competition and
pushed prices down. But this may be one of the “other
justifications” referenced by the Court for the reverse payments,
186
since it is an “offsetting or redeeming virtue” of the agreement.
IV. STRUCTURING OF THE RULE-OF-REASON ANTITRUST LITIGATION
While the Court chose to leave it to the lower courts to
structure the new rule-of-reason antitrust proceedings, it did
provide some guidance.
A.

Guidance from the Supreme Court’s Actavis Opinion

First, the Court pointed out that there is always a sliding scale
when applying a reasonableness standard and noted that “the
187
quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances.”
Thus, lower courts need not insist that a plaintiff “litigate the
patent’s validity, empirically demonstrate the virtues or vices of the

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 2237.
Id.
Id. at 2235.
See id. at 2236.
Id. at 2237–38 (citation omitted).
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patent system, present every possible supporting fact or refute every
188
possible pro-defense theory.” Second, the Court added additional
insight into the rule-of-reason analysis. The likelihood that a
reverse payment brings about anticompetitive effects depends upon
the following four factors:
(1) The size of the payment;
(2) The scale of the payment in relation to the payor’s future
litigation costs;
(3) The payment’s independence from other services for which it
may represent payment;
189
(4) The lack of any other convincing justification.
The antitrust defendant may show that factors (2)–(4) provide
190
a justification for the payment.
B.

Application of the Actavis Rule-of-Reason Analysis

So far, no court has reached the merits of an antitrust reverse
payment case and applied a rule-of-reason analysis. But Judge Walls
in In re Lamictal and Judge Young in In re Nexium provide some
insight into what this analysis may look like. Judge Walls viewed
Actavis as requiring a three part test—two steps to determine when
to apply the rule-of-reason and then a third step applying the rule191
of-reason analysis. According to Judge Walls, in determining
whether to apply the rule-of-reason analysis, the district court
should ask:
(1) “Is there a reverse payment?”
The answer to this question is based upon what the parties
exchanged in settlement and must include monetary
192
payment.
(2) “Is the reverse payment large and unjustified?”
The court noted that only certain reverse payments will actually
193
warrant scrutiny.

188. Id. at 2237.
189. Id. (“The existence and degree of any anticompetitive consequence may
also vary among industries.”).
190. See id. at 2236.
191. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 183627, at *13 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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If these two questions are answered in the affirmative, only
194
then does the court apply the reason-of-rule analysis.
In contrast, in evaluating a motion to dismiss, Judge Young
applied a detailed rule-of-reason analysis to evaluate the direct
purchasers’ claims. Judge Young did not ask Judge Walls’s
preliminary questions. Rather, instead of applying a three-part test,
Judge Young evaluated whether there was a reverse payment and
whether the payment was large and unjustified. As described in
195
detail above,
the direct purchasers challenged agreements
between AstraZeneca and three generic defendants (Ranbaxy,
Teva, and Dr. Reddy’s). In applying the rule-of-reason analysis,
Judge Young considered three primary factors: “(1) whether ‘the
alleged agreement involved the exercise of power in a relevant
economic market,’ (2) whether ‘this exercise had anti-competitive
consequences,’ and (3) whether ‘those detriments outweighed
196
efficiencies or other economic benefits.’”
1.

Market Power in the Relevant Market

In Judge Young’s case, the defendants challenged the direct
purchasers’ proposed market—the brand name drug, Nexium, and
197
its generic equivalents. The defendants argued that the proposed
market was too narrow because it excluded other products that
either have similar chemical structure or were used to treat
198
comparable medical conditions. Judge Young found that this
199
argument “r[a]ng hollow.” The relevant market for antitrust
purposes is made up of “commodities reasonably interchangeable
200
by consumers for the same purposes.” According to Judge Young,
reasonable interchangeability does not depend on similarity of
forms and functions, but instead on the cross-elasticity of
demand—”the extent to which purchasers will accept substitute

194. Id. at *13–14.
195. See supra Part II.C.1.b.
196. In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., Civ. A. No. 12-MD-02409WGY, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *44 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2013) (internal
citations omitted).
197. Id. at *46.
198. Id. at *46–47.
199. Id. at *47.
200. Id. at *48 (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 395 (1956)).
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201

products in instances of price fluctuation and other changes.”
The direct purchasers expressly alleged that Nexium only exhibits
202
positive cross-elasticity with AB-rated generic versions. Noting
that other courts have ruled that both a brand name drug and the
related generics fall within the bounds of the relevant market,
Judge Young decided that such an intense factual determination is
203
best left to a jury.
For the purposes of deciding the motion to dismiss, Judge
Young presumed that the relevant market was simply the brand
name drug and the generic, and found that the Plaintiffs alleged
more than enough facts for a reasonable jury to conclude that the
204
defendants exercised market power. Judge Young found that
205
direct evidence of market power, and that AstraZeneca, as a
monopolist, charged supracompetitive prices for brand name
206
Nexium.
2.

Anticompetitive Consequences

Defendants also argued that the direct purchasers failed to
207
allege a cognizable injury to competition. The direct purchasers
alleged that the generic defendants would have entered the market
prior to the expiration of the patents but for the settlement
208
209
agreements. The defendants assert this was too speculative. The
generic defendants argued that there was no indication that they
210
would have prevailed in litigation or launched “at risk.” Dr.
Reddy’s further argued that Ranbaxy’s right of 180-day exclusivity
211
precluded it from entering the market. Judge Young recognized
that the case law was divided as to whether allegations based on
speculations about generic entry into the market resting upon but212
for theories of causation raised a triable antitrust issue. However,
201. Id. at *48 (citing George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders,
Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 552 (1st Cir. 1974)).
202. Id. at *48–49.
203. Id. at *49–50.
204. Id. at *50–52.
205. Id. at *52–53.
206. Id. at *53.
207. Id. at *53–54.
208. Id. at *54.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. See id. at *55–56.
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Judge Young found that the direct purchasers’ allegations were
sufficient. Judge Young noted that the generic defendants had
launched “at risk” in the past and rejected Dr. Reddy’s argument,
because courts have been skeptical of agreements that allow a first
filer who does not intend to market its drug to use its 180-day
213
exclusivity period to prohibit other generic competition.
In addition, Judge Young applied an “additional gloss to the
214
As
standard antitrust-injury analysis” outlined in Actavis.
described above, the Supreme Court identified four factors that
impact the likelihood that a reverse payment has anticompetitive
effects—(1) the size of the payment, (2) the scale in relation to
future litigation costs; (3) the independence from other services;
215
and (4) the lack of any other convincing justification. Judge
Young, at this stage in the proceedings, did not explicitly apply
each factor. Rather, he viewed the test as stating that “only those
reverse payment agreements whose anticompetitive consequences
are sufficiently great and sufficiently unrelated to the settlement of
216
a particular patent dispute will be censured by the courts.”
As described in detail above, Judge Young found that
AstraZeneca’s no-AG agreement with Ranbaxy and AstraZeneca’s
forgiveness of Teva’s and Dr. Reddy’s contingent liabilities for past
patent infringement regarding different drugs should be classified
217
Judge Young determined that there was no
as a payment.
218
“persuasive procompetitive justification” for the agreements.
Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the direct
purchasers, Judge Young found that the agreements sufficiently
implicate anticompetitive consequences to allow the case to
219
proceed.
In his case, In re Lamictal, Judge Walls viewed the no-AG
agreement differently. Judge Walls found the agreement would
have minimal effects on competition because the generic was
allowed six months of early entry, there was no payment of money,
and the duration of the no-AG agreement was a relatively brief six

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at *56–57.
Id. at *57.
See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
See In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *58.
See supra text accompanying notes 165–71.
See In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *58.
Id. at *58–59.
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220

months. Judge Walls also found that the no-AG agreement was
justified. While the “value to [the generic] of the [no-AG
agreement] likely exceeds what the parties would have spent
litigating the patent dispute, the consideration which the parties
exchanged in the settlement is reasonably related to the removal of
221
uncertainty created by the dispute.”
3.

Weighing Economic Detriments Against the Economic Benefits

In In re Nexium, Judge Young further determined that the
defendants did not put forth “a shred of affirmative evidence” that
tended to show that the agreements had any “procompetitive”
222
benefits. According to Judge Young, the only conceivable benefit
of reverse payment agreements is the settlement of patent disputes,
and this benefit does not overcome the anticompetitive
223
consequences caused by the agreements. Judge Young noted that
Actavis recognized that reverse payments that reflect “traditional
settlement considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair
224
value for services” do not raise the same concerns. Judge Young
did not find that these “traditional settlement considerations” were
225
present.
Judge Young appeared to doubt the economic benefit of the
agreements. Judge Young noted that the presumption of validity
for patents is in doubt and that while patent holders have broad
exclusionary rights, those rights are limited. He cited an FTC study
claiming that “[g]eneric applicants prevail[] [seventy-three]
226
percent of the time.” Therefore, Judge Young concluded that the
227
direct purchasers’ complaint was sufficient.
220. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9257, at *28 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014).
221. Id. at *29. Judge Walls distinguished In re Nexium by stating that there was
“one crucial distinction: the plaintiffs alleged that the brand name manufacturer
not only entered into a [no-AG] agreement but also paid the first filing generic
millions of dollars. Id at *26. But see In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696,
at *60 n.20 (“[T]he inclusion of a monetary payment [from the brand name
manufacturer to the first filed generic] ultimately does not affect this Court’s
analysis . . . .”).
222. In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *64.
223. Id.
224. Id. at *64–65.
225. Id. at *65.
226. Id.
227. Id. at *66.
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Exception to Antitrust Liability—Noerr-Pennington Immunity

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides immunity “to
persons and organizations who, with the intent to restrain trade
and diminish competition, act in concert to petition the
government to adopt laws and implement policies that are
228
anticompetitive in nature.” AstraZeneca argued, on behalf of all
defendants, that because the New Jersey District Court entered
consent judgments sanctioning the settlement agreements, any
229
anticompetitive harm is attributable to government action. Each
of the agreements required court approval to go into effect.
Moreover, the New Jersey District Court formally enjoined the
230
generic defendants from placing the generic on the market.
Generally, private settlement agreements that are not
231
approved by a judge are not provided this immunity. However,
there is a question as to whether consent judgments are provided
immunity. Relying on the framework outlined in a thirteen-year-old
law review article, Judge Young determined that the consent
232
judgments in this case would grant such immunity.
Judge Young’s analysis boiled down to answering a single
question: “Is the private conduct a valid effort to influence
233
government?” Judge Young determined that a consent judgment
could not be considered as direct “petitioning” of the
234
government. His rationale was that in settlement negotiations,
the parties privately negotiate the terms and present them to the
235
court. In contrast, a judicial opinion is aided by the adversarial
236
process and the judge can review the merits of the claims. In
addition, Judge Young found that the consent judgment was not
237
While such things as pre-suit
“incidental” to the litigation.
demand letters, discovery communications, decisions regarding

228. Id. at *67–68.
229. Id. at *69.
230. Id. at *70.
231. Id. at *71 (citing Raymond Ku, Antitrust Immunity, the First Amendment and
Settlements: Defining the Boundaries of the Right to Petition, 33 IND. L. REV. 385, 404
(2000)).
232. Id.
233. Id. at *72.
234. Id. at *74.
235. Id.
236. Id. at *73–74.
237. Id. at *75–76.
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settlement offers, and litigation threats have been granted
immunity, Judge Young found these distinct from consent
judgments, since they have the common purpose of persuading a
238
judicial officer to redress a grievance. Such is not the case with a
consent judgment. Most settlements are made without a final stamp
from the judge and consent judgments are made at the behest of
239
the private parties. Judge Young determined that the consent
judgments in this action served only to “memorialize a bargainedfor agreement” and that nothing prevented the parties from simply
240
stipulating to dismiss the patent actions.
Judge Young viewed the role of the New Jersey District Court
241
as merely perfunctory. While AstraZeneca argued that the New
Jersey District Court exercised its discretion in enjoining the
generic defendants, it was unclear to Judge Young how much
content in the agreements could be found in the consent
judgment, since the agreements were heavily redacted and entering
a consent decree did not reflect a court’s assent to the substance of
242
the settlement agreements. Thus, Judge Young determined that
243
the consent judgments were not afforded immunity.
V. INSIGHT INTO HOW COURTS MAY STRUCTURE ANTITRUST
PROCEEDINGS AND APPLY THE ACTAVIS RULE-OF-REASON
The differences in Judge Walls’s approach and Judge Young’s
approach of applying Actavis demonstrate the uncertainty that the
decision has created. Yet, the decisions provide at least some
insight into how courts may view antitrust proceedings. First,
reaching early resolution through a motion to dismiss or a motion
for summary judgment may be challenging depending upon which
approach a district court adopts and the specific terms of the
settlement. For example, if a district court adopts Judge Young’s
approach of subjecting all settlements to a rule-of-reason analysis,
disagreement on the appropriate market can cause a factual
dispute. While Judge Young appeared to be willing to entertain the
notion that the market was larger than simply the brand name drug

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at *76.
Id. at *77.
Id.
Id. at *79.
Id. at *81.
Id. at *82.
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244

and its AB-rated generic versions, he deemed it a factual inquiry
for the jury. In In re Nexium, the defendants proposed a market that
included Prilosec (the active ingredient is omeprazole) and
245
Nexium (the active ingredient is esomeprazole). Omeprazole is a
246
mixture of two optical isomers —esomeprazole (S-omeprazole)
247
248
and R-omeprazole. Both are used to treat acid-related diseases.
249
Despite these similarities, Judge Young was unwilling to expand
250
the market without a more detailed factual record.
Second, providing a detailed justification for the reverse
payment will be extremely important. Judge Young took a very
broad view of what constituted “payment” from the brand name
manufacturer to the generic manufacturer by including the no-AG
251
agreements and forgiveness of contingent liabilities. Since there
is divergent case law on whether nonmonetary compensation
constitutes a “payment,” it is important to be able to justify any
compensation that flows from the brand name manufacturer to the
generic manufacturer. Reading Actavis as holding that reverse
payments are only justified if they reflect the payor’s future
litigation costs is incorrect. The Supreme Court clearly stated that
the payment may represent compensation for other services, or
244. The FDA evaluates whether certain drugs are therapeutically equivalent.
As part of this evaluation, the FDA assigns certain codes or ratings. A drug product
that has been demonstrated as bioequivalent has the identical active ingredient,
dosage form, route of administration, and the same strength as another drug
product that will be given an AB-rating to that drug product. For a detailed
discussion of FDA codes, see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED
DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at xiii–xx (34th ed.
2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApproval
Process/UCM071436.pdf.
245. In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., No. 12-md-02409-WGY,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *26 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2013).
246. This describes two chemical structures that are mirror images of each
other.
247. See T. Andersson et al., Pharmacokinentics and Pharmacodynamics of
Esomeprazole, the S-Isomer of Omeprazole, 15 ALIMENTARY PHARMCOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 1563, 1563 (2001).
248. Id.
249. In very simplistic terms, the active ingredient in Prilosec contains the
active ingredient in Nexium plus a compound that is the mirror image of
Nexium’s active ingredient.
250. See In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *50.
251. Id. at *60–62 (“Adopting a broader interpretation of the word ‘payment,’
on the other hand, serves the purpose of aligning the law with modern-day
realities.”).
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252

there may be some other convincing justification. The procedural
posture of Actavis should not be forgotten. While the Actavis
defendants described the payments as for other services, such as
marketing to urologists and backup manufacturing, the FTC
alleged that these payments were intended to keep the generics off
253
the market. The Court was simply determining whether or not
the FTC should be allowed to proceed with its case. The Court did
not determine whether the defendants’ justifications were
meritorious.
Third, in addition to providing a detailed justification for the
reverse payment, it is important to show how the payment reflects
“traditional settlement considerations.” While not critical to Judge
Walls’s analysis, Judge Young determined that the agreements in In
254
re Nexium did not reflect traditional settlement considerations.
Judge Young appeared to have a very narrow view of what
constitutes traditional settlement considerations. Part of the Teva
and Dr. Reddy’s settlement agreements dealt with forgiving
255
contingent liabilities from other cases. It is common for parties to
enter into broad settlements that settle a variety of issues between
them. In addition, it is not readily apparent how relief of an
unrelated liability is “using . . . monopoly profits to avoid the risk of
256
patent invalidation or a finding of non-infringement.” Rather, it
could simply be that the parties wanted to call a truce. Whether
such global settlements or “side deals” are part of “traditional
settlement considerations” is up for debate.
Fourth, antitrust defendants should be prepared to present
evidence regarding the strength of the underlying patent. Judge
Young made a point to mention that the presumption of validity of
patents is in doubt and cited the FTC statistic that generics prevail
257
seventy-three percent of the time. While other studies have found
252. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (“[T]he
likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive effects depends
upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs,
its independence from other services for which it might represent payment, and
the lack of any other convincing justification.”).
253. Id. at 2229.
254. In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *65.
255. Id. at *58.
256. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
257. In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *65 (citing FED. TRADE
COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 16
(2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports
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258

that the generic success rate is typically less than fifty percent,
antitrust defendants may have to demonstrate why in their
underlying patent case a generic victory would have been difficult.
The evidence required will depend upon the specific allegations
and facts of the underlying patent case.
Fifth, there is a very slight chance that settlements may be
259
granted Noerr-Pennington immunity. While Judge Young said
that “the very fact that the Defendants can with a straight face
advance this Noerr-Pennington argument based on consent
judgments” should give judges pause, in his opinion he appears to
slightly struggle with the fact that the New Jersey District Court
260
enjoined the generic manufacturer’s from entering the market.
The settlement agreements were heavily redacted, and it was not
clear how much of the settlement agreements had been endorsed
261
by the court. This may present an opening, however small, for
Noerr-Pennington immunity. If the defendants in an antitrust
action can show that the court in the underlying patent dispute
considered the terms of the settlement agreement in issuing
judgment, there is a slight chance that the judgment may be
provided immunity.
VI. CONCLUSION
In his dissent in Actavis, Justice Roberts predicted “that the
majority’s decision may very well discourage generics from
262
challenging pharmaceutical patents in the first place.” Only time
will tell if Justice Roberts is correct. One thing is for certain: there
will be more litigation outlining the contours of the Actavis
decision. The FTC has committed to pursue litigation of past,
present, and future agreements it deems as pay-for-delay.
Courts will have to address the basic question of what is a
“payment.” The FTC holds the view that no-AG agreements are
/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf).
258. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 28
(2012).
259. See Melissa Lipman, Drug Cos. Say Noerr Doctrine Bars FTC’s Pay-for-Delay
Suit, LAW360 (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/496522/drug-cos
-say-noerr-doctrine-bars-ftc-s-pay-for-delay-suit.
260. In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *82 n.29.
261. Id. at *81–82.
262. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2247 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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reverse payments. Will courts read Actavis narrowly and follow the
rationale in In re Lamictal that reverse payments are simply
monetary payments? Or will courts interpret Actavis broadly and
follow Judge Young’s rationale that payments include monetary
and nonmonetary compensation? And courts will have to establish
criteria for what makes a payment “large.” Is the size of the
payment based solely on the expected profits of the generic had it
won the patent litigation? Or is “large” simply in the eye of the
beholder?
Courts will also have to address when to apply the rule-ofreason analysis. Is Judge Walls correct that the district court must
first determine whether there was a reverse payment and whether
that payment was large and unjustified before applying the rule-ofreason analysis? Or is Judge Young correct that such questions are
part of the rule-of-reason analysis?
While courts are sifting through these basic questions, one
thing is clear: antitrust defendants should be prepared to justify any
payment. Actavis clearly contemplates that the payment can be
something more than a rough estimate of future litigation costs to
the brand name manufacturer. Payments can be for unrelated
services, but antitrust defendants should be prepared to explain, in
detail, the value of the services and how the parties reached that
number. What is unclear is what other justifications may exist for a
reverse payment. If a first filer gives up its 180-day market
exclusivity, like Actavis did, does that impact the analysis? Are there
other “traditional settlement considerations,” like global litigation
settlements, that would justify a reverse payment?
While the Court rejected the FTC’s desire for a “quick look”
approach, the rule-of-reason approach may encourage the parties,
at least in part, to argue the merits of the underlying case. When a
court weighs the economic detriments against the economic
benefits, the likelihood of the generic prevailing may become an
issue. What courts, and ultimately juries, decide is sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the patent is strong depends on the
facts of the individual case and will be determined over time.
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